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D
o banks discriminate against minority loan applicants? One approach
to answering this question is to estimate a model of bank lending
decisions in which the probability of being denied a loan is a function
of a set of creditworthiness variables and a dummy variable for the applicant’s
race (z = 1 for minorities, z = 0 for whites). A positive coefﬁcient on the
race dummy is taken as evidence that minority applicants are less likely to be
granted loans than white applicants with similar qualiﬁcations. This approach
is employed in many empirical studies of lending discrimination (Schill and
Wachter 1994; Munnell et al. 1992), in U.S. Department of Justice lending
discrimination suits (Seiberg 1994), and in regulatory examination procedures
(Bauer and Cromwell 1994; Cummins 1994).
One weakness of this approach is that an estimate of the discrimination
coefﬁcient may be biased when measures of creditworthiness are fallible. In
such situations, distinguishing racial discrimination from unmeasured racial
disparities in creditworthiness can be difﬁcult. If true creditworthiness is lower
on average for minority applicants, the model may indicate that race adversely
affects the probability of denial, even if race plays no direct causal role.
There are good reasons to believe that measures of creditworthiness are
fallible. First, regulatory ﬁeld examiners report difﬁculty ﬁnding matched pairs
of loan ﬁles to corroborate discrimination identiﬁed by regression models. An
applicant’s ﬁle often yields a picture of creditworthiness different from the one
given by model variables. Second, including more borrower ﬁnancial character-
istics generally reduces discrimination estimates, sometimes to zero (Schill and
Wachter 1994). Third, studies of default data ﬁnd that minority borrowers are
more likely than white borrowers to default, even after controlling for income,
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wealth, and other borrower characteristics related to creditworthiness (Berkovec
et al. 1994). This ﬁnding suggests that there are race-related discrepancies be-
tween the true determinants of creditworthiness and the measures available to
econometricians.
Our objective is to develop a method for assessing the sensitivity of lending
discrimination estimates to measurement error. In particular, we study the classi-
cal errors-in-variables model, in which the components of a vector x of observed
measures of creditworthiness are, one for one, fallible measures of those in a
vector of true qualiﬁcations x∗.1 The implications of errors in variables in the
standard linear regression model are well known (Klepper and Leamer 1984;
Goldberger 1984).2 We brieﬂy review these implications in Section 1. Models
of lending discrimination generally specify a nonlinear regression model, such
as the logit model, because the dependent variable is dichotomous (y = 1 if the
loan application is denied; y = 0 if it is accepted). In this article we extend the
results for the linear case to cover the nonlinear logit regression model widely
used in lending discrimination studies.
Linear errors-in-variables models are underidentiﬁed because variation in
true qualiﬁcations cannot be distinguished from error variance. Assuming that
the errors are normally distributed with known parameters, however, the linear
model is just-identiﬁed, allowing estimation of model parameters depending
on the assumed error-variance parameters. Assuming zero error variance yields
the standard linear regression model as a special case. By estimating under a
range of error-variance assumptions, one can trace out the potential effect of
measurement error on model parameter estimates. Note that since the error-
variance assumptions make the model just-identiﬁed, no one assumption about
the error-variance parameters is more likely than any other; that is, estimates of
model parameters under alternative error-variance assumptions are all equally
consistent with the data. Also note that in the case of normally distributed re-
gressors in the linear model, parameter estimates for alternative error-variance
1 The classical errors-in-variables model is not the only one in which observed variables,
taken together, are fallible measures of true creditworthiness. Alternatives include “multiple-
indicator” models in which observed variables are fallible measures of a single index of credit-
worthiness, and “omitted-variable” models in which some determinants of creditworthiness are
unobservable. All are alike in that a component of the true model is unobserved by the econo-
metrician; thus, all are latent-variable models. Because errors in variables is one of the simplest
and most widely studied models of fallible regressors, it is a useful starting point in examining
fallibility in empirical models of lending discrimination.
2 Interest in the errors-in-variables problem has surged since 1970. As Hausman and col-
leagues (1995) stated, “During the formative period of econometrics in the 1930’s, considerable
attention was given to the errors-in-variable[s] problem. However, with the subsequent emphasis
on aggregate time series research, the errors-in-variables problem decreased in importance in most
econometric research. In the past decade as econometric research on micro data has increased
dramatically, the errors-in-variables problem has once again moved to the forefront of econometric
research” (p. 206).        
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assumptions can be obtained through an algebraic correction to the ordinary
least squares estimates.
In Section 2 we examine the logit model under errors in variables and
show how estimators depend on assumptions about error variance. Adjusting
estimators for error variance is no longer an algebraic correction as it is in the
linear setup; the model must be reestimated for each error-variance assumption.
For the case in which the independent variables are continuous-valued, we show
how to estimate the logit model under various assumptions about error variance.
Because of the nonlinearity, the logit model is in some cases identiﬁed without
error-variance assumptions. In practice, however, the logit model is quite close
to underidentiﬁed, and little information can be obtained from the data about
error-variance parameters. Therefore, we advocate estimating models under a
range of error-variance assumptions to check the sensitivity of estimates to
measurement error.
In Section 3 we demonstrate our method using artiﬁcial data. We show how
estimates of a discrimination parameter can be biased when a relatively modest
amount of measurement error is present. The magnitude of the bias depends on
the model’s fundamental parameters. By estimating the model under different
assumptions about measurement error variance, we can gauge the sensitivity of
the estimators to errors in variables. Section 4 concludes and offers directions
for further research.
Bauer and Cromwell (1994) have also studied the properties of logit regres-
sion models of lending discrimination, focusing on the small-sample properties
of a misspeciﬁed model using simulated data. They found that tests for lending
discrimination were sensitive to sample size. Our work focuses on the effect
of errors in variables on the large-sample properties of otherwise correctly
speciﬁed logit models of lending discrimination.
1. ERRORS IN VARIABLES
The implications of errors in variables are easiest to see in a linear setup such as
the following simple model of salary discrimination.3 Suppose that an earnings
variable (y) is determined according to the following equations:
y = βx∗ + αz + v, (1a)
x∗ = x0 + µz + u, (1b)
3 The exposition in this section is based on Goldberger (1984). This model of salary
discrimination has a close parallel in the permanent income theory. Friedman (1957) discusses
how racial differences in unobserved permanent income (the counterpart of qualiﬁcations in the
salary model and creditworthiness in the lending model) bias estimates of racial differences in
the consumption function intercept.      
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x = x∗ + e, (1c)
where the scalar x∗ = true qualiﬁcation, x = measured qualiﬁcation, and z is
a race dummy (z = 1 for minorities, z = 0 for whites). We take v, u, and e to




e, all independent of z. The earnings variable in (1a) is a stochastic
function of the true qualiﬁcations and race. The parameter α represents the in-
dependent effect of race on salary, and α<0 represents discrimination against
minorities. If better-qualiﬁed applicants obtain higher salaries, then β>0. In
(1b) qualiﬁcation is allowed to be correlated with race; the expectation of x∗
is x0 for whites and x0 + µ for minorities. The empirically relevant case has
µ<0. Observed qualiﬁcation in (1c) is contaminated by measurement error e.
Consider a regression of y on the observed variables x and z. This estimates
E[y | x,z] = bx + az.
Since the variances and covariances are the same for both white and minor-
ity applicants, we can use conditional covariances to calculate the regression
slopes. We focus on relationships in a population and thus ignore sampling
variability. The least squares estimators are
b = cov(x,y | z)/v(x | z) = cov(x∗,y | z)/v(x | z) = (1 − δ)β
and
a = E[y | z = 1] − E[y | z = 0] − b{E[x | z = 1] − E[x | z = 0]}
= α + βµ− bµ






When there is measurement error (σ2
e > 0), the regression estimator of β is
biased toward zero. To see why, substitute for x∗ in (1a) using (1c) to obtain
y = βx + αz + (v − βe). The “error” v − βe in the regression of y on x and
z is correlated with x via (1c). Thus a key assumption of the classical linear
regression model is violated, and the coefﬁcients are no longer unbiased.
In our case (β>0, µ<0), the estimator of α is biased downward as well.
Bias creeps in because z is informative about x∗, given x;
E[x∗ | x,z] = (1 − δ)x + δ(x0 + µz).
Given observed qualiﬁcation x, race can help “predict” true qualiﬁcation x∗.
Race can then help “explain” earnings, even in the absence of discrimination
(α = 0), because race is correlated with true qualiﬁcations.
The model (1) is underidentiﬁed (Kapteyn and Wansbeek 1983). A re-
gression of x on z recovers the nuisance parameters x0 and µ, along with      
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v(x | z) = σ2
u + σ2
e. Other population moments provide us with a and b, but
these are not sufﬁcient to identify α, β, and δ. No sample can provide us with
enough information to divide v(x | z) between the variance in true qualiﬁcations
σ2
u and the variance in measurement error σ2
e. Under the assumptions β>0
and µ<0, any value of α>a, including the no-discrimination case α = 0, is
consistent with the data for some β and σ2
e.
If σ2




and could calculate the unbiased estimators ˆ α and ˆ β by correcting the ordinary
least squares estimators as follows:
ˆ β = b/(1 − δ) (2a)
ˆ α = a − δbµ/(1 − δ). (2b)
One could use (2) to study the implications of alternative assumptions about the
variance of measurement error; different values of σ2
e would trace out different
estimates of α.
In (1) the direction of bias in a is known when the sign of βµ is known.
Matters are different when x is a vector of characteristics affecting qualiﬁca-
tions. Consider a multivariate model:
y = β x∗ + αz + v, (3a)
x∗ = x0 + µz + u, (3b)
x = x∗ + e, (3c)
where x∗ and x are now k × 1 random vectors and β, µ, and x0 are k × 1
parameter vectors. We take u and e to be normally distributed random vectors,
independent of v, z, and each other, with zero means and covariance matrices
Σ∗ and D. The classical assumption is that measurement errors are mutually
independent, so D is diagonal.
The least squares estimators are now
b = (Σ∗ + D)−1Σ∗β (4a)
and
a = α + (β − b) µ. (4b)
The direction of bias is now uncertain, even under the usual assumption that
measurement errors are independent (D is diagonal). To see why, suppose that
k = 2, Σ∗ has ρ as the off-diagonal element, and Σ∗ + D has ones on the
diagonal (a normalization of units). Then (4b) becomes
a = α + [(D11β1 − ρD22β2)µ1 + (D22β2 − ρD11β1)µ2]/(1 − ρ2).
The bias in a could be positive or negative, depending on parameter values.
For example, suppose only one component of x is subject to measurement               
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error, say, x1 (D11 > 0 and D22 = 0). By itself this would bias b1 downward,
resulting in an upward bias in a. But b2 = ρβ1D11/(1−ρ2)+β2 is now biased
as well, and this would induce downward bias in a if ρβµ > 0. The overall
direction of bias is indeterminate (Rao 1973; Hashimoto and Kochin 1980).
But again, if the measurement error parameters D were known, then the least
squares estimators a and b could be corrected by a simple transformation of
(4) (using Σ∗ =Σ− D, where Σ=v(x | z)). Each alternative measurement
error assumption would imply a different estimator.4
2. ERRORS IN VARIABLES IN A
LOGIT MODEL OF DISCRIMINATION
In model (3) the dependent variable is a linear function of the explanatory vari-
ables. In models of lending decisions the dependent variable is dichotomous:
y = 1 if the applicant is denied a loan, and y = 0 if the applicant is accepted.
In this case the linear formulation in (3) is unattractive (Maddala 1983). A
common alternative is the logit model, shown here without errors in variables:
Pr[y = 1 | x,z] = G(β x + αz), (5a)
G(t) =
1
1 + e−t, (5b)
where x is a vector of characteristics inﬂuencing creditworthiness. The empir-
ically relevant case has β<0, so applicants who are more creditworthy are
less likely to be denied loans. A value of α>0 would indicate discrimination
against minorities: a minority applicant is approximately α(1 − G) times more
likely than an identical white applicant to be denied a loan.5
The parameters α and β can be estimated by the method of maximum
likelihood. The log likelihood function for a sample of n observations












Pr(yi | xi,zi) = G(β xi + αzi)yi[1 − G(β xi + αzi)](1−yi).
Estimators are found by choosing parameter values that maximize log L. The
likelihood depends on the parameters of the conditional distribution in (5) as
4 Klepper and Leamer (1984) and Klepper (1988b) show how to ﬁnd bounds and other
diagnostics for the linear errors-in-variables model.
5 The elasticity of G with respect to z is αG /G = α(1 + e−t)e−t/(1 + e−t)2 = αe−t/(1 +
e−t) = α(1 − G), where G is evaluated at β x + αz.         
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well as on the “nuisance parameters” governing the unconditional distribution
of (x,z). Since the nuisance parameters appear only in the second sum in (6),
while α and β appear only in the ﬁrst sum, α and β can be estimated in this
case without estimating the nuisance parameters.
Under errors in variables, (5a) is replaced with
Pr[y = 1 | x∗,z] = G(β x∗ + αz), (7)

















The likelihood function now depends on Pr(x | x∗), the probability that x is
observed if the vector of true characteristics is x∗. Since x − x∗ is the vector
of measurement errors, Pr(x | x∗) is the probability distribution governing the
measurement error. In the linear model (3) the least squares estimators could be
corrected algebraically for measurement error of known variance. In the logit
model, however, there is no simple way to adjust maximum likelihood estima-
tors for errors in variables, since the regression function is nonlinear. Instead,
we must estimate α and β for each distinct assumption about Pr(x | x∗).
Unlike the one in (6), the log likelihood function in (8) is not separable
in the nuisance parameters of the distribution Pr(x∗,z). Even if we posit an
error distribution Pr(x | x∗), estimating α and β requires estimating the param-
eters of Pr(x∗,z) as well. The estimation of these nuisance parameters will be
sidestepped here by maximizing the conditional likelihood function














We will assume that Pr(x∗ | x,z), the distribution of true characteristics condi-
tional on observed characteristics and race, is known.
Our model is completed by adding speciﬁc assumptions about the distri-
butions Pr(x | x∗) and Pr(x∗ | z), which will allow us to derive Pr(x∗ | x,z). We
will maintain the assumptions embodied in (3b) and (3c):
x∗ = x0 + µz + u, (10a)
x = x∗ + e, (10b)           
26 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
where β, µ, and x0 are k×1 parameter vectors and where u and e are normally
distributed random vectors, independent of v, z, and each other, with zero
means and covariance matrices Σ∗ and D. Given x and z, x∗ is then normally
distributed with mean vector m∗ and covariance matrix S∗, where
m∗ = DΣ−1µz + (I − DΣ−1)x, (11a)
S∗ = (I − DΣ−1)D. (11b)
With this result in hand, we ﬁnd that, conditional on x and z, the argument of
G is normally distributed with mean β m∗+αz and variance β S∗β. Therefore,
the likelihood in (9) can be written as
Pr(y | x,z) =

G(m + σs)(2π)−1/2 exp(−s2/2)ds, (12)
where
m = β (I − DΣ−1)x + (α + β DΣ−1µ)z,
σ = [β (I − DΣ−1)Dβ]1/2.
When D = 0, m collapses to β x + αz and σ = 0, which is the error-free
model.6
Because of the nonlinearity of G, the logit model can potentially be iden-
tiﬁed without error-variance assumptions, unlike the linear model in Section
1. Thus, in principle, the error-variance parameters could be estimated rather
than imposed. In practice, however, the model is so close to linear that the
error-variance parameters cannot be estimated; even large samples are uninfor-
mative about D. We therefore recommend estimating the model under a range
of alternative error-variance assumptions.
To summarize the procedure, ﬁrst calculate least squares estimators for the
parameters x0, µ, and Σ. These parameters are treated as ﬁxed and combined
with an assumed D to obtain the distribution Pr(x∗ | x,z), which is used in (12)
and (9) to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of α and β. This procedure
treats the error variance D as known, just as the error-free model treats D
6 The joint normality of x and x∗ given z implies that given x and z, x∗ is normal with
parameters that can be derived algebraically from the parameters of Pr(x | x∗) and Pr(x∗ | z).
Other distributional assumptions on x and x∗ are far less convenient. For example, when x∗ takes
on discrete values, a more general approach is required to derive Pr(x∗ | x,z). Given a distribution
of the observables Pr(x,z), recover Pr(x∗ | z) using Pr(x | z) =

Pr(x | x∗)Pr(x∗ | z)dx∗, and
then use Bayes’s rule to obtain Pr(x∗ | x,z) = Pr(x | x∗)Pr(x∗ | z)/Pr(x | z). The ﬁrst of these
steps involves inverting a very large matrix.           
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as identically zero. Estimates of α can then be traced out under alternative
assumptions on D.7
Our procedure will misstate the uncertainty about parameter estimates,
even conditioning on D. By implicitly assuming that the estimated parameters
x0, µ, and Σ are known, we are neglecting their sampling variability. These
parameters appear in (12) and thus inﬂuence estimates of α and β. Our pro-
cedure therefore misstates their sampling variability as well. When D = 0, the
nuisance parameters disappear from (12), and this problem does not arise.8
3. EXAMPLES
In the examples in this section, we apply our procedure in a logit model of
discrimination to show how the technique is capable of detecting the sensitivity
of parameter estimates to errors in variables. We ﬁnd it convenient to use ar-
tiﬁcially generated data sets to illustrate our results. Artiﬁcial data allow us to
isolate important features of the errors-in-variables model for a wide array of
cases. Observations are randomly generated under a given, true error variance,
and the model is then estimated under various hypothesized error variances.
In the simplest case there is only one explanatory variable besides race
(k = 1). We assume α = 0, β = −1, µ = −2, and Σ=1. (We focus on
the no-discrimination case, α = 0, solely for convenience.) In this case, if a
is signiﬁcantly different from zero, then it is also signiﬁcantly greater than α,
and the usual t-statistic on a will also show whether a is signiﬁcantly biased.
The sample was assumed to be half white (z = 0) and half minority (z = 1).
Using these values and an assumed true error variance D, we generated 10,000
random observations on x∗, x, and y using equations (7) and (10). We then
estimated the model using maximum likelihood, assuming that the true values
of µ and Σ were known and making an assumption about ˜ D (not necessarily
the same as D). The results are displayed in Table 1. The sample size of 10,000
was chosen to reduce sampling variance.
For the estimates shown in Panel A of Table 1, the true variance of the
measurement error is D = 0.1. This represents one-tenth of the total variance
in observed x, a relatively modest amount. The ﬁrst line reports estimation
under the (incorrect) assumption that the error variance is zero. As expected,
the estimate b is biased toward zero. Consequently, a is biased upward, toward
showing discrimination, and is signiﬁcant.
7 In related work, Klepper (1988a) extended the diagnostic results of Klepper and Leamer
(1984) and Klepper (1988b) to a linear regression model with dichotomous independent variables.
These earlier approaches attempted to characterize the set of parameters that maximize the like-
lihood function. Levine (1986) extended the results of Klepper and Leamer (1984) to the probit
model.
8 Speciﬁcally, the hessian of the log likelihood function is then block diagonal across (α,β)
and (x0,µ,Σ).              
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Table 1 Coefﬁcient Estimates for
Alternative Error-Variance Assumptions, k = 1
µ = −2, Σ=1, n = 10,000.
ab
















Notes: t-statistics are shown in parentheses beneath the coefﬁcient estimates. For each panel, we
drew a set of 10,000 random realizations for (y, x): 5,000 with z = 0 and 5,000 with z = 1.
Within each panel, estimation was performed on the same data set with different assumptions
about the error variance ˜ D.
The last two lines in Panel A show estimates assuming positive error vari-
ance. For larger values of ˜ D, b is closer to one and a is closer to zero, the true
value. The discrimination parameter is not signiﬁcantly different from zero
when estimated assuming D is 0.05 or 0.1. In this case, then, our procedure
successfully detects the sensitivity of parameter estimates to errors in variables.
In Panel B we examine the case in which no measurement error is present
and the true discrimination parameter is positive. The (correct) assumption of
no measurement error now yields estimates that are unbiased; they differ from
the true parameters only because of sampling error. Imposing the (incorrect)
assumption of positive measurement error variance “undoes” a nonexistant bias,
resulting in a near zero and a larger negative b.
Table 2 shows how the magnitude of the bias varies with the correlation
between components of x when k = 2. Σ has diagonal elements equal to
one and off-diagonal elements equal to a scalar ρ, where −1 <ρ<1. D
has diagonal elements all equal to 0.1; the independent variables other than
race suffer from measurement error of the same variance. We maintain α = 0,                  
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Table 2 Coefﬁcient Estimates for Alternative Correlation and
Error-Variance Assumptions, k = 2































, n = 10,000.
ab 1 b2
A. ρ = 0:
Assumed ˜ d
0.0 0.4299 −0.8340 −0.8663
(4.2028) (−25.2057) (−25.7966)
0.1 0.0394 −0.9557 −0.9924
(0.3483) (−24.3926) (−24.9389)
B. ρ = 0.5:
Assumed ˜ d
0.0 0.2975 −0.8797 −0.8705
(3.4439) (−22.8422) (−22.5769)
0.1 0.0419 −0.9726 −0.9597
(0.4506) (−20.2974) (−20.0418)
C. ρ = −0.5:
Assumed ˜ d
0.0 0.7672 −0.7816 −0.7714
(5.5997) (−21.8801) (−21.5103)
0.1 −0.0457 −1.0084 −0.9969
(−0.2720) (−21.4374) (−21.1531)
Notes: t-statistics are shown in parentheses beneath the coefﬁcient estimates. For each panel, we drew a
set of 10,000 random realizations for (y, x): 5,000 with z = 0 and 5,000 with z = 1. Within each panel,
estimation was performed on the same data set.
β = (−1,−1), and µ = (−2,−2). Panel A shows that when the components of
x are uncorrelated, the bias is larger than in the comparable k = 1 model: 0.43
versus 0.14. When the components of x are positively correlated (ρ = 0.5), the
bias is smaller by almost a third but is still signiﬁcant. When the components of
x are negatively correlated (ρ = −0.5), the bias is substantially larger. Thus the
bias in a varies negatively with ρ, just as the linear case suggested. A positive
value of ρ implies that measurement error in x1 biases the coefﬁcient on x2
away from zero, counteracting the effect of measurement error in x2. Although
bi is biased toward zero by measurement error in xi, the bias is somewhat offset
by the effects of measurement error in other components of x.
When k = 1, the direction of bias is determined entirely by the sign of βµ.
When k > 1, the direction of bias depends on Σ and D, even when β µ can be
signed. Table 3 illustrates this fact for k = 2, showing a set of parameters for
which a is biased against ﬁnding discrimination. Both x1 and x2 are plagued
by measurement error, but with a strong positive correlation between the two,                  
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Table 3 Coefﬁcient Estimates for
Alternative Error-Variance Assumptions, k = 2
































, n = 10,000.
ab 1 b2
Assumed ˜ d
0.0 −0.2445 −0.2352 −0.7703
(−3.4442) (−7.0602) (−21.9616)
0.1 0.0312 −0.0887 −0.9962
(0.2888) (−1.6430) (−17.3444)
Notes: t-statistics are shown in parentheses beneath the coefﬁcient estimates. For each panel, we
drew a set of 10,000 random realizations for (y, x): 5,000 with z = 0 and 5,000 with z = 1.
Within each panel, estimation was performed on the same data set.
each has a dampening effect on the bias in the coefﬁcient of the other variable.
The net bias in b2 is toward zero, but b1 is biased away from zero. Since x1 is
more strongly correlated with z, the net effect is a negative bias in a. With the
correct error-variance assumption, the model detects the lack of discrimination.
In Table 4 we display results for a model with k = 10, a size that is more
like that of the data sets encountered in actual practice. With ρ = 0, we see in
Panel A that with more correlates plagued by measurement error, the bias in
a is larger. With ρ = 0.5, the various measurement errors partially offset each
other, but a remains signiﬁcantly biased. Once again, our technique faithfully
compensates for known measurement error.
4. SUMMARY
We have described a method for estimating logit models of discrimination under
a range of assumptions about the magnitude of errors in variables. Using artiﬁ-
cially generated data, we showed how the bias in the discrimination coefﬁcient
varies with measurement error and other basic model parameters. Our method
successfully corrects for known measurement error, and can gauge the sensi-
tivity of parameter estimates to errors in variables. Our method can be applied
to the studies of lending discrimination cited in the introduction. It can also
be applied to the empirical models employed in lending discrimination suits
and regulatory examinations. Since the stakes are high in such applications, the
models ought to be routinely tested for sensitivity to errors in variables.
Further extensions of our method would be worthwhile. Although we allow
for errors only in continuous-valued independent variables, studies of lending               
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Table 4 Race Coefﬁcient Estimates for Alternative Correlation and
Error-Variance Assumptions, k = 10
α = 0, β is a k × 1 vector of −1s, µ is a k × 1 vector of 1s, Σ is a k × k matrix
with 1s on the diagonal and off-diagonal elements equal to ρ, D is a k × k matrix with
0.1s on the diagonal and off-diagonal elements equal to 0, ˜ D is a k × k matrix with
elements ˜ d on the diagonal and off-diagonal elements equal to 0, and n = 10,000.
a












Notes: t-statistics are shown in parentheses beneath the coefﬁcient estimate. For each panel, we
drew a set of 10,000 random realizations for (y, x): 5,000 with z = 0 and 5,000 with z = 1. Within
each panel, estimation was performed on the same data set.
discrimination often include discrete variables that are likely to be fallible as
well. It would be worthwhile to allow for errors in the discrete variables, as
Klepper (1988a) does for the linear regression model. In addition, it would be
useful to allow for uncertainty about the nuisance distributional parameters that
our method treats as known.
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